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Pricing in Network Effect Markets
Oliver Wendt, Falk von Westarp, Wolfgang König
Institute of Information Systems
J. W. Goethe-University, Mertonstr. 17, 60054 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
{wendt | westarp | koenig}@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de

Abstract- According to literature, penetration pricing is
the dominant pricing strategy for network effect markets.
In this paper we show that diffusion of products in a network effect market does not only vary with the set of pricing strategies chosen by competing vendors but also strongly depends on the topological structure of the customers’
network. This stresses the inappropriateness of classical
"installed base" models (abstracting from this structure).
Our simulations show that although competitive prices tend
to be significantly higher in close topology markets, they
lead to lower total profit and lower concentration of vendors’
profit in these markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Positive network effects (said to be existent whenever the
willingness to pay for a certain product depends on the number
of other users of the same product) are an important characteristic of modern information technology markets. These effects
strongly influence the marketing strategies of vendors. Beside
the product policy, e.g. choosing the degree of compatibility to
other products, the communication policy, e.g. influencing the
expectations about future success of a network effect product,
the pricing strategy is most important for the success of network effect products. Generally speaking, pricing is of great
importance for all stages of the product life cycle ([22], pp. 56). When introducing a product to the market suppliers must
convince potential early consumers to buy although they do not
experience any positive network effects yet. Typically they do
so by low prices which later increase with growing market
share. But even when a critical mass of users was successfully
established, pricing remains a critical factor to build entry
barriers against competitors since modern network effect markets tend to be very dynamic.
Pricing models of traditional network effects theory generally focus on the installed base of a given product, i.e. the total
number of users within the whole market, as the most important factor for buying decisions. Contrary to this, we propose
that the individual environment in the personal communication
network of a potential consumer determines the buying decisions and must therefore be taken into account when designing
appropriate pricing strategies for network effect markets.
In the remainder of this article we will first analyze existing
pricing models of the network effect literature and identify
existing insufficiencies (section 2). In section 3 we will present
results of earlier research introducing our basic simulation
model. Based on the findings we will conduct simulations of
dynamic pricing strategies of competing vendors analyzing the
implications of different market topologies. Concluding the
paper, we will summarize our findings and give an outlook on
further research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are various approaches in economic literature analyzing the pricing of network effect goods. Estimating the hedonic
price function some authors prove the existence of network
effects for products like computer hardware [9], spreadsheet
software [6], database software [15], and word processing
software [7] and evaluate their influence on the market price
empirically. The regression analysis shows that in network
effect markets the price consumers are willing to pay is significantly higher if product characteristics enable compatibility
and therefore generate network effects [7].
Focussing on optimal pricing in network effect markets two
strategies have been distinguished in the literature. Personal
price differentiation means that network effect goods like
software are sold to different user groups for a different price if
the market allows such a separation. In the context of positive
network effects the idea is to sell the product cheaper (or even
giving it away for free) to consumers with a low willingness to
pay (students, seniors) to increase the installed base. With
growing market share and growing network effects the sales of
the product increase generating revenue from the groups with a
higher price, e.g. companies ([22], [16]). This approach reflects
the general assumption of most network effect models namely
that the installed base of the whole market and not the personal
network of a consumer influences the individual buying decision. Apart from the fact that today’s students might become
full paying customers in the future, is obvious that this assumption is unrealistic since students will rather communicate with
other students and companies will rather communicate within
their business networks devaluing the network effects of the
respective other group. We will later show the implications of
this aspect. Dynamic pricing is another strategy that is analyzed by many authors ([22], [11], [12], [13], [23], [3]). Generally, an increasing price path is proposed for network effect
goods, meaning that a new product is free or sold very cheap in
the beginning of its life cycle to gain an installed base big
enough to overcome the start-up problem. With increasing
positive network effects and therefore higher willingness to
pay, in later periods the price will be raised generating sufficient revenue.
Taking the phenomenon of critical mass and the start-up
problem into account these pricing strategies are analyzed for
vendors in monopolistic ([22], [23], [3]), or competitive environment ([22], [12]). Some authors also directly compare pricing strategies and its implications for different market types
(monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly) ([5], [22]).
Other prominent areas of interest are pricing and licensing to
competitors ([4]), pricing and switching costs ([13], [14]),
pricing and timing of upgrades ([17], [23]), bundling strategies
([1]).
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Most of the existing approaches use equilibrium analysis to
analytically determine the results of pricing strategies in terms
of market share. Network effects are considered in a rather
general way, focussing only on the installed base of the whole
market. The importance of personal communication networks
are not taken into account which implies that the market is
considered to be a completely connected graph in which every
consumer is influenced by the buying decisions of every other.
The more realistic assumption of bounded rationality is not
modeled (every market participant knows the decisions of
everyone else). However, since assuming bounded rationality
usually implies the impossibility of determining analytical (ex
ante) results for an aggregated entity - such as a whole network
consisting of individually deciding agents - in terms of the
existence and/or efficiency of equilibria, a recourse to empirical and simulative approaches seems unavoidable. Wiese [22]
criticizes the simplifications of analytical models and develops
a simulation model with the more realistic assumption of discrete parameters (e.g. participants, number of sold products
and time) replacing the simplification of continuous parameters
and marginal results of analytical models. Defining price, heterogeneity of preferences and one- or double-sided compatibility as parameters his models allow for more complexity and a
more detailed analysis of pricing and other marketing strategies. While this approach can be seen as a step in the right
direction, once again network effects are modeled by installed
base neglecting structural determinants of the market which, as
we will show in the remainder of this article, play an important
role for the diffusion of network effect goods.

uniform distribution over [0; 1]. Then the network’s topology
was determined by choosing a certain connectivity (number of
connections to other consumers) and a certain closeness. The
closeness ∈ [0; 1] is the continuous probability that a given
node gets his c direct neighbors assigned to be the c consumers
geographically closest to the node at stake. With the probability (1- closeness) the direct neighbors get randomly selected.
The extreme cases, i.e. all nodes get assigned to closest resp.
random neighbors, are referred to as close topology or random
topology, respectively.
The graphs in figure 1 show sampled cases of the close topology (exemplary for 100 consumers and a connectivity c of
two, five and ten, respectively). As we see, a low number of
neighbors may lead to a network structure which is not fully
connected, i.e. its consumers can only experience network
externalities within their local cluster.

Figure 1. Typical networks with two, five or ten closest
neighbors (close topology, i.e. closeness = 1.0).

III. STRUCTURE MATTERS: EARLIER RESEARCH RESULTS
A

Simulation Model

In earlier research we analyzed the impact of structural characteristics of markets (such as connectivity, centrality, and
topology) on the diffusion of network effect goods. We got
different results for high-price and low-price markets indicating that structural determinants might also be important for
choosing the optimal pricing strategy in network effect markets. In the following we will shortly describe those parts of
the simulation design and results that will be important for our
further research described in the remainder of this article (for a
comprehensive description see [19] and [21]).
We based our simulations on a simple model of the individual buying decision in network effect markets. A participant
buys a certain product exhibiting network effects whenever the
expected benefits are larger than the expected cost whenever
the benefits (sum of stand-alone benefits and network effect
benefit; the latter depending on the number of other adopters
that are linked to this participant) are larger than the costs. In
case of competing products in a market, the consumer buys the
product with the maximum surplus if this exceeds zero. The
decision is discrete, meaning that it is not rational to buy or use
more than one unit of the same product or even of different
products. This is an assumption which especially makes sense
for information goods like software or telecommunication
products. The network effects in the utility function only depend on decision behavior of the direct communication network of the potential buyer. This assumption is confirmed by
empirical research in the software markets [20] and also pays
tribute to the bounded rationality of real-world actors.
Network structure. The networks were generated as follows. First the n consumers are randomly distributed on the
unit square, i.e. their x- and y-coordinates get sampled from a

Figure 2. Typical networks with two, five or ten random
neighbors (random topology, i.e. closeness = 0.0).
The standardization processes in individual clusters cannot
diffuse to any consumer of a different cluster. These "subpopulations" evolve in total separation and it is therefore rather
unlikely, that all the isolated regions evolve to the same global
standard. With increasing connectivity (five or ten neighbors),
the chances that a network is not connected gets rather small,
i.e. every sub-group of consumers, agreeing on a specific product, may "convince" their direct neighbor clusters to join them.
The "domino effects" finally might reach every consumer even
in the most remote area of the network. However, the number
of "dominos" that have to fall before a standard which emerged
far away in a certain area of the network reaches the local environment of an actor and therefore influences the decision to
adopt is typically much higher than in the corresponding graph
with random topology. Speaking more formally, the average
length of the shortest path connecting two arbitrarily chosen
vertices of the graph (i.e. the number of neighbors you have to
traverse) is smaller for the same connectivity if the graph has a
random topology.
Figure 2 shows the graphs with the same connectivity (2, 5,
and 10) but random topology. The optical impression of a
higher connectivity (which is an illusion) results from the fact
that we selected "neighbors" to represent an asymmetric relation. That is, when consumer x gets positive external effects by
a neighbor y, it is unlikely in the random topology that vice
versa, y also gets positive effects from x. Of course, within the
close topology symmetric neighborhood is more common
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meaning that there is a higher probability that if y is the closest
neighbor from the perspective of x, at the same time x is also
the closest neighbor from the perspective of y. In this case the
two links are plotted on top of each other and that is why the
close topology graphs look less connected.
Of course, most real-world networks represent an intermediate version of these extreme types, but since the costs of bridging geographic distance get less and less important the more
information technology evolves, the tendency is clear. Electronic markets will rather resemble the random type of structure (since we select our partners by other criteria than geographical distance), while in markets for physical goods (or
face to face communication) the physical proximity is still a
very important factor for selecting business partners and therefore, the close topology will be a good proxy to the real world
network structure.

was reached. We also tested our simulations for other network
sizes without significant difference in the general results. The
distribution in this equilibrium was then condensed into the
Herfindahl1 index used in industrial economics to measure
market concentration (e.g. [18]). In the following diagrams,
every small circle represents one observation. All entities of
our model were implemented in JAVA 1.1 and their behavior
was simulated on a discrete event basis.

close

Preferences, Prices, and Network Effects. Regardless of
topology, in our simulation, every consumer can choose from
all existing software products and knows all their prices. Initially, all consumers are (randomly) equipped with one software product, which may be considered to be their "legacy
software" that is already installed and does not cause any further cost.
The direct utility that each consumer draws from the functionality of the v different products is then sampled from a
uniform random distribution over the interval [0;util]. For each
consumer and every software we use the same interval. Thus, a
value of util=0 leads to homogeneous direct preferences (of
zero) while the higher the exogenously given value of util, the
more heterogeneous the preferences of the consumers get (with
respect to the different software products as well as with respect to the neighbors they communicate with).

random

The weight of the positive network externalities deriving
from each neighbor using the same software has been set to an
arbitrary (but constant) value of 10,000 (for every consumer
and every run).
In order to isolate the network externalities and heterogeneity of consumer preferences from other effects, we decided to
fix all prices for the products to a constant value and all marketing expenditures to zero for the simulations presented here,
i.e. consumers decide solely upon potential differences of direct utility and the adoption choices of their neighbors.
Dynamics of the decision process. In each iteration of the
diffusion, every consumer decides whether to keep her old
network effects product or whether to buy a new one based on
the decision rationale described above. The old product is assumed to be discarded once a new one is bought, i.e. it can
neither provide the deciding consumer with direct utility nor
the neighbors with positive externalities anymore. The adoption decisions are made in a sequential order, i.e. all consumers
may always be assumed to have correct knowledge about the
product their neighbors are currently using. Although we have
not yet established a formal proof, for our simulations this
decision process always converged towards an equilibrium in
which no actor wanted to revise his decision anymore. We did
not experience any oscillation, although oscillation dynamics
might not be surprising, when collusion is excluded and vendors are mutually trying to outperform competitors.
A total number of 6,000 independent simulations were run
(3,000 for low-price and high-price markets, respectively) with
1,000 consumers and 10 different products until an equilibrium

Figure 3. Equilibria in close topology and random topology
networks for low-price markets.

1

The Herfindahl index is calculated by summing up the
squared market share for each vendor. If all market shares are
evenly distributed among our ten alternative products, we get
the minimal concentration index of 10*(0.1)^2 = 0.1 while we
get a maximal concentration index of 1*1^2+9*0^2 = 1 if the
diffusion process converges to all consumers using one identical software product.
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B

Diffusion in Low-price and High-price Markets

Prices were fixed to the same constant value for all products.
For the low-price markets the price has been chosen to be
$50, which means switching to another product is very cheap
compared to the positive externalities from neighbors (worth
$10,000) if they use the same product.
The top diagram in figure 3 illustrates the strong correlation
(0.756) of connectivity and equilibrium concentration for close
topology in low-price markets. Despite of this strong correlation it can clearly be seen that even in networks with 200
neighbors per consumer (i.e. a connectivity of 200) the chances
are still very low that one product completely dominates the
market. For random topologies (figure 3, bottom) an even
stronger correlation (0.781) is obtained. Note that all the correlation illustrated in this paper are significant on the 0.01 level.

there is no diffusion process at all. Therefore, after some test
simulations we tried to select a "critical value" as the constant
price by fixing it to the consumer’s expected direct utility.
Thus, whenever we sample direct utility from the interval
[0;util] we fix the price of every products to 0.5*util. This
means that for about half of the consumers the direct utility
from owning a specific product would not compensate for the
costs as long as there are no neighbors yielding any network
effects. The high number of processes that end in a low concentration equilibrium even for high connectivity (fig. 4) supports this rationale when we compare our results to the processes obtained for low price software (fig. 3). Note, that in the
bottom graph of figure 4 the x-axis only scales up to 100
neighbors.
close

The scale of connectivity is extremely different in the two
graphs of figure 3. It is scaled from 1 to 10 neighbors in the
bottom diagram (random topology). It can clearly be seen that
already for 10 neighbors per consumer (1% of the total population) it is almost certain that only one product will finally take
over the whole market. It is obvious that in comparison to close
topology markets the likelihood for total diffusion of only one
product is very high in random topology networks even for
very low connectivity.
We also considered the heterogeneity of preferences in the
analysis as a third dimension. We did not find any significant
dependency of the sampled equilibria on this factor for close
topologies (figure 3, top) and a slight but significant negative
correlation for random topologies (-0.141) (figure 3, bottom).
Comparing this with the top graph where the probability of
reaching a concentration higher than 0.2 is almost zero for the
same connectivity strongly supports our hypothesis that for a
given connectivity the indirect domino effects are much
stronger for random topology networks and thus the diffusion
process shows much higher tendencies towards standardization. To test this statistically, we ran a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (e.g. [10]) rejecting the hypothesis that the concentration
indices obtained for close and random topologies follow the
same distribution on a significance level better than 0.0005
(KS-Z of 2.261). This result substantiates our findings statistically.

random

A second interesting phenomenon can be seen in the fact,
that although the mean concentration for a random topology
networks of connectivity 5 is about 0.5, there are hardly any
equilibria with concentration indices between 0.2 and 0.8, i.e.
either the diffusion process leads to one strong product or
many products will survive. This is different for close topology
models where intermediate solutions with two or three strong
products can be stable equilibria, obviously being the result of
sub-groups of consumers (with strong intra-group communication and fewer links to other groups) collectively resisting
external pressure to switch their selected product.
While the low-price model may be correct for competing
shareware e-mail tools, or free internet-based phone or meeting
software, for many other network effect products the ratio of
price towards positive network externalities is less extreme.
Therefor, we also conducted simulations in high-price markets. Increasing the prices (while still being identical for all
products) will of course lead to higher inertia of the consumers
to buy a new product despite all of the neighbors using it. If we
select too high a price everyone sticks to his initial solution and

Figure 4. Equilibria in close and random topology networks for
high-price markets.
We still get more 1.0 concentration equilibria (total diffusion
of one product) for random topologies than for close topologies. Nevertheless, even for random topologies the inertia effect is very strong. However, for both topologies there still is a
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significant positive correlation of connectivity and concentration (0.120 for close and 0.231 for random) although much
weaker than for the low price markets.
Another very interesting effect can be observed if we additionally consider heterogeneity of preferences. In contrast to
figure 3, we find a much higher negative correlation, significant for both, close (-0.611) and random (-0.500) topologies.
Although higher heterogeneity has the positive effect of increased utility surplus for some consumers, others get even
more reluctant to pay the high price, when there are no
neighbors yet sharing this products.
IV. SIMULATION OF PRICING STRATEGIES
The influence of topology on the diffusion of innovations in
networks is obvious. While the close topology generally is the
basis for a greater diversity of products since cluster or groups
of consumers can be relatively independent from diffusion
processes in the rest of the market, the random topology tends
to market dominance of one or few products.
Up to now all prices got fixed once, identical for all vendors
and kept constant over all periods of the diffusion process. In
this section of the paper we will now relax this assumption and
explore the interplay of diffusion processes and pricing strategies of the vendors.
A

Simulation Design

For reasons of computing time we restricted the length of the
diffusion process (which was twenty) to five periods, not really
posing a restriction since most diffusion processes reached an
equilibrium earlier than period five.
Our ten vendors are assumed not being able to directly observe the prices of their competitors but only the reaction of
the customers, reacting to their own pricing strategy by comparing the price and benefits of their products to those of their
competitors.

increase profit (in most cases at cost of other vendors). This
chance is taken by simply adding a random vector of five price
"deltas" (drawn from a normal distribution of mean zero and
variance) to the old strategy and then testing the new strategy
by simulating a diffusion. Whenever the new strategy outperforms the old one or yields the same profit, the old strategy
gets replaced by the new one, otherwise the old one is kept and
modified with another delta vector when it is this vendor’s turn
again.
Since all vendors exhibit this behavior, we might expect the
"price battle" to lead to a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a set of price
strategies, which makes it impossible for any vendor to improve his own profit when all other vendors stick their current
strategy. Unfortunately, although many battles reached an
equilibrium in the sense that no vendor successfully tried to
modify his strategy for some thousands of iterations, this does
not mean that this equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, since
there still might be a delta vector we just didn’t sample yet and
we can neither enumerate all possibilities nor analytically
prove that there cannot exist such a superior strategy, since our
diffusion process may itself only be simulated. On the other
hand, it might be possible to establish theorems, proving that
under specific circumstances the negative effects of rising or
lowering a price x in an early period may not be compensated
by any adaption of prices in a later period thus showing that x
is part of a Nash equilibrium if (and only if) we can prove the
same for all prices of consecutive periods (and all other vendors).
B

Results

Nevertheless, our results once again show that the equilibria
resulting from this collective learning process leads to pricing
strategies which again (indirectly) depend on the network’s
structure, influencing the customers’ reaction to a given set of
price strategies.

In the sequel, a pricing strategy is considered to be a vector
of five discrete integer prices, one for each period, not restricted to be positive, since we do not want to exclude the
possibility to subsidize the use of a product in an early period
(i.e. investing in a higher installed base) in order to "skim" the
revenue from followers in later periods.
For every set of ten price strategies we obtain a specific diffusion process of a given network and thus a specific revenue
(being equal to profit since we do not consider any cost at the
vendors’ side) for a given network topology for a given initial
endowment and a specific order of decisions.
As before, we sample a topology and initial endowment and
run the diffusion process (for 1000 customers with connectivity
of 10, centrality fixed to zero), but not only once as before but
10,000 times with different pricing strategies, allowing the
vendors to "learn how the market behaves" in response to their
strategies and of course trying to find the strategy that maximizes their individual profit accounted for over the five periods.

Figure 5. Summed total profit of all 10 vendors.

At the start of the "pricing battle" all vendor have a constant
price of 100 for each of the five periods. In the first simulated
diffusion process this set of strategies yields a vector of 10
total profits. In each of the 10,000 diffusion runs another vendor gets the chance to adapt her pricing strategy in order to

We see from figure 5 that the total cumulated profit over all
vendors (almost linearly with a correlation of -0.67) falls with
the chosen closeness of the customers’ network topology
while, as expected, this total profit concentrates on less vendors in random topology markets than it does in close topology
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markets where many vendors survive with a substantial market
share. Once again, the Herfindahl index was used to illustrate
this concentration (c.f. figure 6).
Although we might expect this to result from lower equilibrium prices in close topology markets, the following set of
price charts (one for each of the five periods) clearly refutes
this hypothesis: For all five periods the price positively correlates with topological closeness (with correlations of 0.23,
0.46, 0.76, 0.78 and 0.77 respectively).

Figure 6. Concentration of total profit.
Of course, if profits fall despite increases in prices, the answer lies in the number of customers buying the product: In
close topology markets most customers only buy a product
once, leading to stable clusters of local standards, while in the
more “global” markets with random topology the first choice
made to align the own endowment with ones neighbors turns
out to be erroneous, forcing me (and my neighbors) to buy a
new product in a subsequent period (like most owners of beta
VCRs finally bought a VHS recorder too and owners of WordPerfect bought MS Word). Therefore, in a close topology market, vendors have the chance to behave like “local monopolists”, each of them having their stable groups of customers
crystallizing, but in most cases only have one chance to charge
them. On the other hand, in random topologies there is a higher
potential of selling, but also higher competition and thus the
danger of losing at least those “follow up” sales to the competitor having turned out to be the standard in a later period. But
nevertheless, also those vendors “loosing the battle” may derive a substantial share of total profit from the “wrong” initial
decisions, which explains why even for random topologies the
average concentration of total profit (over all periods) is only
0.6 although the market is taken over completely by one product and thus the concentration measured by number of users is
1.0 in those random topology cases.
As we see from the first two charts in figure 7 and figure 8
(the latter explicitly shows the price difference between the
first two periods) penetration pricing indeed turns out to be the
dominant strategy for all vendors, no matter whether the topology is close or random.
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Figure 8. Concentration of total profit.
We also notice that after period 2 equilibrium prices fall
again. That they may even fall below zero seems completely
irrational for period five, since there is no future period in
which such a subsidization could pay off. But since price
changes get accepted as long as they yield the same (or a
higher) profit, the vendors do not “notice” this, as long as there
is no customer actually switching to their product and thus
“asking” for the subsidy, i.e. this can only happen when diffusion has reached an equilibrium in an earlier period.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Figure 7. Average equilibrium prices for different
periods of the diffusion process.

But interestingly enough, although we started each “battle”
with an initial prices of 100, the vendors collectively (but
without any chance for collusion!) rose this price up to a much
higher level of about 10,000. This is exactly the utility drawn
from a neighboring consumer using the same product. Why
this is a critical value gets clear when we imagine a customer
currently using product A and having e.g. three neighbors
using the same product but four using product B (the remaining
three neighbors using one or more other products): As long as
the price of B is smaller than 10,000 the customer will be better off buying the new product, otherwise it will stick to A.
Therefore, offering a price slightly below this threshold may in
fact speed up diffusion of a product. That the average prices lie
above the threshold is explained by the fact that once a vendor
has to fight a competitor with a penetration strategy, it might
turn out to be rational rather to “give up” the fight and rather
select a skimming strategy by charging a higher price in the
first period(s).

Our simulations have shown that diffusion of products in a
network effect market does not only vary with the set of pricing strategies chosen by competing vendors but also strongly
depends on the topological structure of the customers' network.
This stresses the inappropriateness of "installed base" models
(abstracting from the topological structure). Although competitive prices tend to be significantly higher in close topology
markets, they lead to lower total profit and lower concentration
of profit for these markets.
Despite these interesting results many open questions remain. Our ongoing research mainly concentrates on answering
the following:
•

Under which assumptions could a given solution be
proven to be a Nash equilibrium? Are these assumptions
plausible for real-world markets?

•

How do the strategies of (ex post) "winners" of the
competition game differ from those of "losers" and what
may the "losers" learn form this? (Simply copying the
winners' strategy cannot make the losers better off since
if it did, their current strategy would not be an equilibrium.)

•

Of course, optimizing one's individual pricing strategy
by this type of "learning by simulating the market and
simulating the competitors" may heavily depend on how
well the customer's decision model reflects their real
decision function and thus we may not derive a direct
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recommendation for pricing a product since it might be
better to run a less profitable pricing strategies which is
more robust to variation in customer’s behavior. This
robustness will also be evaluated in future simulations.
•

All customers were assumed to face the identical price
for a given product. Although neglecting price discrimination might be suitable in many markets, another problem remains: the effective cost of implementing the
given product might be dominated by other factors than
the price (e.g. training of personnel, new hardware requirements) strongly depending on the individuals former decisions. Basing our decision on the individually
effective cost may thus be a valuable extension.

•

Why are there very few real-world examples of penetration strategies with significant price increases in later
periods? Netscape completely failed when trying to implement this strategy for its browser, but nevertheless
free beta releases could be considered to represent a basic form of penetration pricing. On the other hand it
might be argued that the markets for most software
products are still growing that fast, that the “penetration
phase” has not come to its natural end yet.
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